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AUTHENTICATION, IDENTIFICATION, AND THE BEST
EVIDENCE RULE
The branch of evidence law dealing with authentication,
identification, and best evidence is encountered in almost
every trial, often when an unsuspecting practitioner is met
with a relevancy objection to his proffered evidence. As re-
cently enacted, Articles IX and X of the Federal Rules of
Evidence preserve the most desirable, common law rules of
evidence law relating to authentication, identification and
best evidence, expanding them where necessary to update
and simplify the law. This comment will examine Articles IX
and X of the Federal Rules, giving special consideration to
the changes from traditional evidence law and to the differ-
ences in comparable Louisiana law.
The Federal Rules treat both authentication and iden-
tification of evidence in a single rule;' however, in explicitly
separating the two concepts the Rules are superior to prior
codifications, 2 which referred only to authentication as the
condition precedent to admission of documents and thus
merged the separate concept of identification with that of
authentication. 3 Although the terms have at times been used
indiscriminately, 4 authentication has traditionally referred
1. FED. R. EVID. 901(a) (1975): "The requirement of authentication or
identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evi-
dence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its
proponent claims."
2. MODEL CODE OF EVID. rule 601(a)(1942): "A writing, offered in evi-
dence as authentic, is admissible, if (a) sufficient evidence has been intro-
duced to sustain a finding of its authenticity." UNIFORM RULE OF EVID. 67
(1953): "Authentication of a writing is required before it may be received in
evidence. Authentication may be by evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of
its authenticity or by any other means provided by law."
3. For the purpose of this comment, the term "identification" will refer
only to proof of real evidence, while the term "authentication" will be re-
served for proof of documents.
4. 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2129 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as 7
WIGMORE]: "This process of authenticating chattels is ordinarily referred to
as identifying them" (emphasis added). Wigmore explains that identification
presupposes two objects, the issue revolving around whether they are identi-
cal or distinct. Although he is theoretically correct, his definition of iden-
tification is based on a foundation requirement, i.e., is the witness competent
to testify as to this object or some other object, and not on the requirement of
connecting the proffered item of real evidence with a certain person, place, or
thing, as the term "identification" is generally used today. For examples of
cases using "authentication" and "identification" indiscriminately, see
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to proof of authorship or personal connection to a writing,
while identification is proof of a personal connection with real
evidence. 5 The distinction between the two concepts is not
merely semantic and should be maintained to promote clear
analysis.
Any item offered as evidence which allegedly has a par-
ticular association with an individual, time, or place must be
linked with that individual, time, or place either before or at
the time of its admission. 6 This requirement underlies both
identification and authentication. 7 For example, when a knife
found at the scene of a crime is offered as evidence against X,
the proponent must first show that the knife was owned by X
or was within his control-identification is necessary. Simi-
larly, when a document claimed to be the will of T is offered in
a probate proceeding it is inadmissible until the proponent
gives some proof that T in fact wrote the will, i.e., authentica-
tion is required. Evidence becomes admissible only upon a
showing of the condition of fact upon which its relevancy
depends, thus authentication and identification have been
referred to as "special aspects of relevancy"; 8 until the neces-
sary connection is made, evidence is simply irrelevant. 9
Although evidence of a proper connection between the
parties or subject matter of the dispute and the tendered
physical evidence is necessary to the admission of real and
documentary evidence, neither authentication nor identifica-
tion assures admissibility, since some other exclusionary
United States v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 432 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1970) and Cork-
erE v. Main Ins. Co., 268 So.2d 138 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972), writ not considered,
263 La. 608, 268 So. 2d 673 (1972).
5. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 212, 218 (Cleary ed. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as MCCORMICK].
6. When tendered evidence "involves impliedly or expressly any element
of personal connection with a corporal object, that connection must be made
to appear, like the other elements, else the whole thing fails in effect." 7
WIGMORE § 2129.
7. Id. "The foundation on which rests the necessity of authentication
[and identification] is not any artificial principle of evidence, but an inherent
logical necessity" (emphasis added).
8. FED. R. EvED. 901, Adv. Comm. Note. See J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
COMMENTARY ON RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND
MAGISTRATES 901(a)[02] at 901-18 (1975) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN &
BERGER]; Michael & Adler, Real Proof, 5 VAND. L. REV. 344, 362 (1952). See
also FED. R. EID. 104(b).
9. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 901(a)[02] at 901-18. See E. MORGAN, BASIC
PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 378 (1962) [hereinafter cited as MORGAN].
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rule might apply. For example, a document fully authenti-
cated may be excluded because of the hearsay rule if offered
for the truth of its assertion, 0 because it is a privileged com-
munication,1" or because it is logically irrelevant. 2
In addition to requiring authentication or identification
of all evidence, Rule 901(a) specifies the degree of proof
necessary to establish connexity with the party or subject
matter in dispute: the evidence must be "sufficient to support
a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims."' 3 Though Rule 901(b) provides illustrations of the
traditional methods of authentication, its preamble clearly
indicates that any evidence, direct or circumstantial, which
satisfies the requirements of Rule 901(a) is sufficient. 4
Self Authentication
Although real evidence must be identified and has no
intrinsic significance, certain documents by their existence
relate, without further proof, to their author. Rule 902 lists
all documents deemed to be self-authenticating at common
law, making necessary additions so that the Rule serves con-
temporary needs.15 The theory underlying Rule 902 is that
10. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER 901(a)[02]; Comment, Hearsay Evidence
and the Federal Rules: Article VIII, 36 LA. L. REV. 139, 142 (1975); see also
Rhoads v. Virginia-Florida Corp., 476 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1973); Matthews v.
United States, 217 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1954); Lathrop v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc.,
351 F. Supp. 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
11. FED. R. EvID. 501: "[I]n civil actions and proceedings, with respect to
an element of a claim or defense as to which state law supplies the rule of
decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, state or political
subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law."
12. See Comment, Determining Relevancy: Article IV of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, 36 LA. L. REV. 70, 71 (1975).
13. FED. R. EVID. 901(a).
14. The best possible direct evidence of a document's authenticity is to
have a party who executed or signed it testify as to its genuineness or to
have a witness to the execution of the document give like testimony. See
Cottingham v. Doyle, 122 Mont. 301, 202 P.2d 533 (1949). See also United
States v. Rizzo, 418 F.2d 71 (7th Cir. 1969). Authenticity of documents may
also be established by circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Champion v. Cham-
pion, 368 Mich. 84, 117 N.W.2d 107 (1962); MacFarland v. MacFarland, 176 Pa.
Super. 342, 107 A.2d 615 (1954); Harlow v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 385, 131
S.E.2d 293 (1963).
15. FED. R. EVID. 902. Ten categories are listed: (1) domestic public
documents under seal, (2) domestic public documents not under seal, (3)
foreign public documents, (4) certified copies of public records, (5) official
1975]
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the vast majority of these documents will be genuine,'16 that
they will invariably show their origin, 17 and that in some
cases, the party against whom the document is offered will be
in a better position to show its lack of authenticity.' In such
cases any benefit to be derived from a requirement of authen-
tication is outweighed by considerations of time, expense, and
fairness to the offering litigant.' 9 The Advisory Committee's
statement in its notes to Rule 902 that the opponent of self-
authenticating evidence is in no case foreclosed from opposing
the authenticity of the offered document is not true as to the
document's admission in the first instance, at least insofar as
objections to admissibility based on failure to authenticate. 20
Public Documents and Records
At common law and in Louisiana a public document
under seal is presumed genuine; 2' Rule 902 incorporates this
doctrine with some modification. A main concern at common
law was which seals of various sovereigns were to be presumed
genuine. Generally, seals of foreign officers and of some low-
publications, (6) newspapers and periodicals, (7) trade inscriptions, (8)
acknowledged documents, (9) commercial paper, and (10) presumptions under
acts of Congress.
16. MCCORMICK § 228 at 557; FED. R. EVID. 902, Adv. Comm. Note.
17. MCCORMICK § 228. The difficulty of forging the kinds of documents
accorded the status of self-authentication, the comparative ease of the detec-
tion of forgeries, and the criminal sanctions imposed for forging these kinds
of documents lend support to the Rule. 7 WIGMORE § 2161 at 638 (seals); 7
WIGMORE § 2158 at 626 (custodian of records); Comment, Authentication and
the Best Evidence Rule Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 16 WAYNE L.
REV. 195 (1969).
18. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 902[01] at 902-10. See, e.g., Mancari v. Frank
P. Smith, Inc., 114 F.2d 834, 837-38 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
19. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 185 at 395-96 (1st ed. 1954). The danger of
injustice and delay is greater in these cases than the danger of forgery. The
Atlanta, 82 F. Supp. 218, 236 (S.D. Ga. 1948).
20. Hedger v. Reynolds, 216 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1954). See generally
WEINSTEIN & BERGER $ 902101] at 902-10. See also Eschete v. Kraemer, 129
So. 2d 475 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961) (party denying signature on notarial
instrument bears burden of proving forgery, since authentic act is proof of
itself); American Creosote Co. v. Springer, 232 So. 2d 532 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1970).
21. 7 WIGMORE § 2161. LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 1393-95, 1397 provide in
general that certified copies of public documents of Louisiana, other states,
the Uni'ted States, and territories thereof are self-authenticating. However,
nothing prevents the proponent of a document from proving them just like
any other item of evidence.
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ranking domestic officers were not considered self-authen-
ticating, although universally the great seal of a state, either
domestic or foreign, made the document presumptively
genuine. 22
In the United States, serious problems of admissibility
arose because each state was considered a foreign sovereign,
and only documents under the great seal of a state were pre-
sumed genuine by courts in the other states. 23 The separate
federal court system adopted the position that documents
under the great seal of a state or under the seals of certain
lower echelon state officials were self-authenticating only if
the state was within the particular federal court's territorial
jurisdiction.24
In an attempt to eliminate confusion, Congress, under the
full faith and credit clause, passed legislation giving ex-
traterritorial effect to sealed documents. 25 The Congressional
scheme provided a complicated procedure for certification of
sealed documents.26 The inadequacies of the federal statute
eventually prompted Congress to enact Rule 44 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which eliminated many of the for-
malities of the former statute and provided a more conve-
nient method of handling sealed documents. 27
Rule 902(1)28 continues the Congressionally-initiated pro-
22. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 902(l[o] at 902-10. Louisiana simply re-
quires a certification by the officer or employee having custody of the docu-
ment accompanied by a certificate of his authority to certify. LA. CODE CIV.
P. art. 1393-97.
23. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 902(1[01] at 902-11.
24. As to official seals of inferior state officers outside its territorial
jurisdiction, federal courts were faced with the same problems as state
courts. Id.
25. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 1 STAT. 122 (1790).
26. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1738, 1739 (1964). These statutes provide a method of
authenticating public documents by the seal of the state and authenticating
"other" documents by a "double authentication of clerk or custodian plus a
guaranteeing certificate under seal." WEINSTEIN & BERGER 902(1)[01] at
902-11.
27. The method in Rule 44 provided a more convenient form of authenti-
cation. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 902(1)[01] at 902-14.
28. FED. R. EVID. 902(1): "Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condi-
tion precedent to admissibility is not required with respect to the following-
(1) A document bearing a seal purporting to be that of the United States, or
of any State, district, commonwealth, territory, or insular possession thereof,
or the Panama Canal Zone, or the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or of
a political subdivision, department, officer, or agency thereof, and a signa-
ture purporting to be an attestation or execution."
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cess of simplifying authentication of documents under seal by
establishing a practical formula for determining whether a
sealed document is admissible as self-authenticating. The
rule precluding private signets is retained, since the Federal
Rule is limited to seals of political bodies. The traditional
common law is changed, however, because the new Rule is
applicable to sealed documents from all levels of government,
rather than exclusively to documents bearing a state's great
seal .29
In contrast with the common law, Federal Rule 902(2)
denies self-authenticating status to a document bearing an
official signature but unaccompanied by a seal;30 a public
document must be accompanied by the seal of an officer with
the requisite duties in the respective political body. Not-
withstanding Rule 902(2), a court should be able to accept as
authenticated a document bearing only the signature of the
officer without a seal if a proper showing, is made under this
Rule or Rule 901(a), the general authentication provision.
Federal Rule 902(3),32 in providing for self-authentication
of foreign public documents, continues the liberal trend of
Rule 44(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by abolish-
ing all unnecessary procedural requirements 33 and by
eliminating the requirement that an American officer be
stationed in a foreign country for the purpose of certifying
documents as genuine.34 The judge is also given the same
29. See generally 7 WIGMORE § 2161.
30. Id.
31. Cf. Morgan v. Curtenius, 17 F. Cas. 747 (C.C.D. Ill. 1848), aff'd 61 U.S.
1 (1859) (signature of probate judge accepted without his seal because cer-
tificate of judge indicated his court, formerly one of record, no longer had a
seal).
32. FED. R. EVID. 902(3): "A document purporting to be executed or
attested in his official capacity by a person authorized by the laws of a
foreign country to make the execution or attestation, and accompanied by a
final certification as to the genuineness of the signature and official position
(A) of the executing or attesting person, or (B) of any foreign official whose
certificate of genuineness of signature and official position relates to the
execution or attestation or is in a chain of certificates of genuineness of
signature and official position relating to the execution or attestation .... If
reasonable opportunity has been given to all parties to investigate the au-
thenticity and accuracy of official documents, the court may, for a good cause
shown, order that they be treated as presumptively authentic without final
certification or permit them to be evidence by an attested summary with or
without final certification."
33. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 902(3)[01] at 902-16.
34. FED. R. EVID. 902(3) modifies Rule 44(a) of the FED. R. Civ. P., how-
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degree of discretion under Rule 902(3) which he has under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44(a) to dispense with final
certification altogether, or to admit attested summaries. 35
Original public documents and records are best preserved
in the place where they are originally filed, and the only
practical method of using public records is by copy. 36 In order
to preserve the integrity of a document and keep it within the
class of documents considered self-authenticating, federal law
and that of virtually all states, including Louisiana, require
that the custodian whose duty it was to preserve the original
certify the copy as genuine. 37 Rule 44(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure provides that copies of official records or
entries therein may be authenticated by the attestation of
the custodian of the record, together with a certificate of the
custodian's authority.38 Rule 902(4), however, requires only
that the custodian certify the accuracy of a copy,39 eliminating
as unnecessary the requirement of certification of the custo-
dian's authority. In the alternative, the new Rule provides
for authentication of an offered document by any method
provided by Congress or the Supreme Court.40
At common law and in Louisiana, officially printed docu-
ments are presumed genuine without further authentica-
tion.4 1 Rule 902(5) expands the rule to include books, pam-
ever, providing that copies as well as original foreign documents may be
treated as self-authenticating. WEINSTEIN & BERGER $ 902(3)[01] at 902-16.
35. The court in its discretion may require the attested summary to be
certified. However, "where parties have had an opportunity to check on the
authenticity of the document, exclusion for lack of a final certificate is seldom
justified. Certainly it should be too late to raise the issue for the first time on
appeal." WEINSTEIN & BERGER 902(3)[01] at 902-18. See also United States
v. Pacheco-Lovio, 463 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1972).
36. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 902(4)[01] 902-19.
37. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833); LA. CODE CIV. P. art.
1394: "An official record, or an entry therein, of the State of Louisiana or of
any political subdivision, corporation, or agency thereof, when admissible for
any purpose, may be evidenced by copies certified as being true copies by the
officer or employee having custody thereof." See also LA. CODE CIV. P. art.
1936; 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1677, 1680 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 44(a).
39. The Advisory Committee pointed out that this method does not apply
to public documents generally, but only to public records. FED. R. EVID. 902,
Adv. Comm. Note.
40. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1955) (judgment in favor of government as
evidence); 25 U.S.C. § 199(a) (1934) (certified copies of Indian tribal records);
43 U.S.C. § 83 (1904) (certified copies of records in district land offices).
41. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 902(5)[01] at 902-25; LA. CODE CIV. P. arts.
1392, 1393; LA. R.S. 13: 3711-13 (1950).
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phlets, or other publications, presumably including "officially
printed volumes of court decisions and miscellaneous public
documents."4 2 The Rule fails to state the level of government
to which the presumption of genuineness applies; however, it
should extend at least as far down the political scale as is
provided in Rule 902(1). 43
Periodical Publications and Trade Inscriptions
Newspapers and periodical publications are treated as
self-authenticating under Rule 902(6)44 primarily because of
the numerous sanctions against misrepresentation and
forgery under which they are published.45 Their treatment as
self-authenticating marks a substantial change from the
strict requirements at common law for extrinsic authentica-
tion of newspapers and periodicals. 46
Rule 902(7) 47 also treats trade inscriptions as self-
authenticating. The rationale supporting self-authentication
of trade inscriptions and trade names is that they are usually
registered with various federal and state agencies, are heav-
ily regulated, 48 and are unlikely to be forged. Rule 902(7) will
undoubtedly avoid the harsh effect of the traditional rules of
authentication in the field of products liability, in which
plaintiffs were "frustrated in legitimate attempts to link the
42. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 902(5)[01] at 902-25. See also, e.g., Walkins v.
Holman, 41 U.S. 25, 55-56 (1842) (American state papers).
43. See generally WEINSTEIN & BERGER 902(5)[01] at 902-26. Compare
Frates v. Eastman, 57 F.2d 522 (10th Cir. 1932) with District of Columbia v.
Johnson, 12 D.C. (1 Mackey) 51, 63-64 (1881).
44. FED. R. EVID. 902(6): "Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condi-
tion precedent to admissibility is not required with respect to the following:
... [pirinted materials purporting to be newspapers or periodicals."
45. Due to the inherent unlikelihood of forgery and the fact that the
party disputing authenticity is usually in the better position to come forward
with proof of its forged character, Rule 902(b) is realistic in providing prima
facie authenticity. See Note, 15 S. CAL. L. REV. 115, 117 (1941). See, e.g., N.Y.
GEN. Bus. L. § 335 (McKinney 1968).
46. See 7 WIGMORE § 2150; 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 440 (3d. ed. 1940)
[hereinafter cited as 2 WIGMORE]; 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1234 (Chad-
bourn ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as 4 WIGMORE].
47. FED. R. EVID. 902(7): "Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condi-
tion precedent to admissibility is not required to the following.
... [i]nscriptions, signs, tags, or labels purporting to have been affixed in the
course of business and indicating ownership, control, or origin."
48. See Doyle v. Continental Baking Co., 262 Mass. 516, 160 N.E. 325
(1928); Weimer v. Mager & Thoane Co., 167 Misc. 338, 3 N.Y. Supp. 918 (Misc.
Ct. 1938).
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defendants to the defective product by means of labels on the
product which bear defendant's brand name or trademark. '49
The Rule will make establishing a party's responsibility for
faulty products easier by making proof of ownership or con-
trol easier.50 The .only requirement of the Rule is that the
inscription, tag, name, or symbol must have been placed on
the product in the course of business. The term "business"
undoubtedly includes businesses which are nonprofit.51
Private Writings and Commercial Paper
Private writings, accompanied by a certificate of acknowl-
edgement executed by a notary public or one authorized by
law to make such certificate, are classified as self-
authenticating documents under Federal Rule 902(8).52 The
theory behind Rule 902(8) is that notaries, due to penalties for
a violation of their duties, will not certify a document unless
the purported writer, presumably known to the notary,
swears to the latter in his presence that he executed the
questioned writing. The notary's certificate attached to the
document appears to be at least presumptive proof that the
document is what its proponent claims.5 3 This is the prefer-
able view and is applied in Louisiana. 54
49. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 902(7)[01] at 902-28. See Keegan v. Green
Giant, 150 Me. 283, 110 A.2d 599 (1954). "[T]his evidence will be admitted
regardless of the evidence the opposing party may have to the contrary, by
the terms of the rule. The opposing party is relegated in this contrary evi-
dence to argument before the jury." WEINSTEIN & BERGER 902(7)[01] at
902-28.
50. See Pittsburg v. Callagham, 157 Ill. 406, 41 N.E. 909 (1895).
51. MCCORMICK § 283 at 599 (1954). "Non-profit businesses would include
numerous social and fraternal organizations that distribute manufactured
goods with inscriptions." Id.
52. FED. R. EVID. 902(8): "Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condi-
tion precedent to admissibility is not required with respect to the following:
... [d]ocuments accompanied by a certificate of acknowledgement executed in
the manner provided by law by a Notary Public or other officer authorized by
law to take acknowledgements."
53. See generally WEINSTEIN & BERGER 902(8)[01] at 902-31. "This man-
ner of self-authentication was recognized at common law for certain types of
commercial paper and by statute for other private writings including deeds,
oaths, and like private documents." 7 WIGMORE § 2165. The basis for this
extension is the theory that "if the Notary is permitted to so authenticate
documents of title, which are covenants of great legal effect, there is no
reason for not allowing other writings to be proved in the same way." WEIN-
STEIN & BERGER 902(81[01] at 902-30.
54. If there were no special treatment given to acknowledged documents
1975]
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Commercial paper, the signatures thereon, and docu-
ments relating thereto are self-authenticating under Rule
902(9) 55 to the extent provided by the "general commercial
laws. ' 56 Since federal jurisdiction in most cases involving
negotiable paper will be predicated on diversity of citizenship
of the parties, under the doctrine of Erie v. Tompkins 57 state
law will govern. The relevant state law is the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 58 which has been adopted at least in part by
every state.59 Even in federal question cases involving com-
mercial paper,60 the Advisory Committee's Notes correctly
point out that "one would have difficulty in determining the
general commercial law without referring to the code."' 61
Traditional Methods of Authentication
and Identification
Although the courts give many documents the special
status of self-authenticating, the genuineness of most docu-
there would be no reason to go through the formality of acknowledgement.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2236: "The authentic act is full proof of the agreement
contained in it, against the contracting parties and their heirs or assigns,
unless it be declared and proved a forgery." Although the authentic act,
which is peculiar to Louisiana law, is not an acknowledged private act as
envisioned by Rule 902(9), it actually is more trustworthy and should be
given at least the same probative effect. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2242: "An act
under private signature, acknowledged by the party against whom it is
adduced, or legally held to be acknowledged, has, between those who have
subscribed it, and their heirs and assigns, the same credit as an authentic
act"; LA. R.S. 13:3720 (1950); LA. R.S. 15:456 (1950); LA. CIV. CODE art. 1647.
55. FED. R. EVID. 902(9): "Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condi-
tion precedent to admissibility is not required with respect to the following-
... [c]ommercial paper, signatures thereon, and documents relating thereto to
the extent provided by general commercial law."
56. Id.
57. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
58. Particularly relevant portions of the Uniform Commercial Code are:
§ 1-202 (making certain documents required by contract to be issued by a third
party prima facie evidence of their own authenticity), § 3-307 (making signa-
tures on negotiable instruments self-authenticating in certain circum-
stances), § 3-510 (relating to formal certificates of protest and providing
that they are presumptive evidence of dishonor), and § 8-105 (creating a
presumption of genuineness for signatures on negotiable securities). Note
that the latter provision has not been adopted in Louisiana.
59. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS at 951 (1974). Presumably, the general commercial
law in Louisiana is the Negotiable Instruments Law to the extent it has not
been superseded by the legislature's adoption of portions of the Uniform
Commercial Code.
60. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
61. FED. R. EVID. 902, Adv. Comm. Note.
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ments and all items of real evidence6 2 is established by tradi-
tional methods of proof. For the most part, the illustrations of
901(b) relate to documentary evidence;6 3. however, Rule 901(a)
clearly indicates that both real and documentary evidence64
must be proved genuine in order to be admissible.
Testimony of a Witness with Knowledge
As in Louisiana,65 Rule 901(b)(1) provides that both
documentary and real evidence may be authenticated or
identified by the testimony of a witness with knowledge that
it is what its proponent claims it to be.66 Testimony of a
witness who, for example, saw a questioned document signed
or who had custody of a particular bag of narcotics is the
simplest and most effective way for proponents of evidence to
prove its genuineness.
Testimony may be in the form of an admission67 by an
adverse party, either on the stand or out of court and re-
ported by another witness; 68 it may also be acquired by call-
62. See FED. R. EVID. 901(a) (requires all evidence to be identified or
authenticated prior to its admission); FED. R. EVID. 902 (applies only to
documentary evidence).
63. "No special rules have grown up about the [identification of] chat-
tels." 7 WIGMORE § 2129. "One method that has developed, however, and has
been illustrated in Rule 901(b)(1) is testimony of a witness with knowledge."
See MCCoRMICK § 212 at 525-26.
64. Tangible evidence may be offered which is not "real evidence" but
merely demonstrative, i.e., it played no part in the event, but is relevant in
helping the trier of fact to understand other evidence, for example, a map, a
chart, or a model. In such cases, the specific identity of the item is of no
consequence and therefore identification is not necessary. MCCORMICK § 212
at 528. For the difference between "real" and "demonstrative" evidence, see
Smith v. Ohio Oil Co., 10 Ill. App. 2d 67, 134 N.E.2d 526 (1956).
65. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2245: "If a party disavowed the signature it must
be proved by witnesses or comparison"; LA. R.S. 15:460 (1950): "Any docu-
ment, other than an authentic act, may be proved by anyone who saw it
written, or by a comparison of hands, or by anyone who, from his knowledge
of the handwriting of the person alleged to have written the document can
testify that the document produced is in the handwriting of said person."
Renard v. Champagne, 14 Orl. App. 179 (La. App. 1917), enunciated the general
rule in Louisiana. See State v. McCranie, 192 La. 163, 187 So. 278 (1939); City
Stores, Inc. v. Jordan, 211 So. 2d 709 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968); Lawney v.
Travelers and Gen. Ins. Co., 169 So. 2d 757 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
66. FED. R. EVID. 901, Adv. Comm. Note.
67. See MCCORMICK § 219 at 545; Comment, Hearsay Evidence and the
Federal Rules: Article VIII, 36 LA. L. REV. 139, 154 (1975).
68. Cottingham v. Doyle, 122 Mont. 301, 202 P.2d 533 (1949); Durham v.
State, 422 P.2d 691 (Wyo. 1967).
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ing a witness who has gained familiarity 9 with the evidence
to the extent that his testimony is relevant to the issue of
identification or authentication. 70 Absolute precision and cer-
tainty is not necessary,71 nor does the Rule require that the
witness by his testimony alone authenticate or identify the
evidence in question. 72
Non-Expert Opinion on Handwriting
Under Federal Rule 901(b)(2), as in Louisiana, 73 any non-
expert witness who is familiar with a purported writer's
handwriting is competent to testify as to the genuineness of a
document claimed to be authored by that writer.74 To gain
sufficient familiarity, a witness need not actually see the
purported author write, if, under the circumstances, the wit-
ness is familiar with samples of his handwriting.75 The suffi-
ciency of a witness's familiarity with the purported writer's
hand does not determine a writing's admissibility, but is a
matter for the jury to consider when determining the weight
to be given to the witness's testimony. Although on its face
69. Rice *v. United States, 411 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1969); WEINSTEIN &
BERGER 901(b)(1)[01] at 901-21.
70. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER 901(b)(1)[01] at 901-22; Comment, Deter-
mining Relevancy: Article IV of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 36 LA. L. REV.
70, (1975).
71. Craft v. United States, 403 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1968); WEINSTEIN &
BERGER 901(b)(1)[01] at 901-22. ;
72. "Any combination of items of evidence illustrated by 901(b)(1-10) will
suffice so long as Rule 901(a) is satisfied." WEINSTEIN & BERGER 901-
(b)(1i101] at 901-22.
73. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2245; LA. R.S. 15:460, 460.1 (1950); Reynard v.
Champagne, 14 Orl. App. 174 (La. App. 1917). See also Behan v. Bullard, 2
McGloin 228 (La. App. 1884) (expert testimony); Olympic Homes, Inc. v. Ory,
207 So. 2d 258 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968) (both expert and non-expert witnesses).
74. FED. R. EviD. 901(b)(2) provides that "non-expert opinion as to the
genuineness of handwriting, based upon familiarity not acquired for pur-
poses of the litigation" is an available method of authenticating documents.
MCCORMICK § 221 at 547. McCormick criticizes this method as "essentially
meaningless" due to the minimum requirements of familiarity, since when a
document is seriously challenged, a layman's testimony could not possibly
sufficiently authenticate it. MCCORMICK at 548. See, e.g., Bennett v. Cox, 167
Ga. 843, 146 S.E. 835 (1929) (expertise not necessary); Apple v. Common-
wealth, 296 S.W. 2d 717 (Ky. 1956); Noyes v. Noyes, 224 Mass. 125, 112 N.E.
850 (1916). See also 2 WIGMORE § 570; WEINSTEIN & BERGER 901(b)(2)[01] at
901-23.
75. Rogers v. Ritter, 79 U.S. 317 (1870); Ryan v. United States, 384 F.2d
379 (1st Cir. 1967); MCCORMICK § 221 at 547.
[Vol. 36
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Rule 901(b) seems dangerously broad, the Rule 602 require-
ment of personal knowledge could exclude the witness's tes-
timony if the court is not satisfied that he has sufficient
familiarity with the writer's hand to make a reasonable iden-
tification.76
Comparison by Expert or Trier of Fact
Proof of evidence by comparison with previously admitted
evidence is a procedure applicable to both real and documen-
tary evidence, and is appropriately called "explanation of re-
sults by tracing them to their causes"; 77 the Federal Rules
sanction the comparison mode of proof of genuineness. 78
Louisiana evidence law, which also permits authentication
and identification of evidence by comparison, 79 differs from
the new Federal Rule in one significant respect: a party ten-
dering the comparative specimen in Louisiana must prove
the genuineness of that specimen to the court's satisfaction
before the fact finder may compare it to the document he
seeks to authenticate; 0 under the Federal Rules the speci-
men is subject to the same scrutiny as the evidence intended
to be proven, and is authenticated or identified by evidence
sufficient to satisfy Rule 901(a). 81
When the similarity of the compared items of evidence is
obvious to a person of ordinary understanding, the compari-
son under Rule 901(b)(3) can properly be made by the trier of
fact; otherwise, an expert should conduct the comparison. 82
76. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 901(b)(2)[01] at 901-25, 901-27. See also In re
Goldberg, 91 F.2d 996, 997 (2d Cir. 1937); Rinker v. United States, 151 F. 755
(8th Cir. 1907).
77. People v. Fisher, 340 Ill. 216, 172 N.E. 743 (1930) (early case of gun
identification by comparison of bullet markings). See generally WEINSTEIN &
BERGER 901(b)(3)(01] at 901-30.
78. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(3). In general, writings can be used as specimens
when they have been authenticated sufficiently to pass the requirements of
Rule 901(a), including any of the illustrative methods in Rules 901(b) and 902
if the document to be used for comparison is self-authenticating.
79. LA. R.S. 15:460.1 (1950); LA. CIV. CODE art. 2245; State v. Burch, 261
La. 3, 258 So. 2d 851 (1972); State v. Reinhardt, 229 La. 673, 86 So. 2d 530
(1956); State v. Barrow, 31 La. Ann. 691 (1879).
80. See, e.g., Fox v. McDonogh's Succession, 18 La. Ann 419 (1866).
81. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 901(b)(3)[02] at 901-31.
82. The propriety of this interpretation has been questioned, however.
"The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 901(b)(3) justifies the reduction in
proof required to establish the authenticity of exemplars on the 'ground that
such high standards are not required in non-writing instances as in the case
1975]
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Distinctive Characteristics
Any item of evidence, real or documentary, may possess
distinctive qualities which serve to identify or authenticate
it.83 Various characteristics of a writing may be sufficiently
distinctive, including its subject matter,8 4 appearance, 5 or
internal language and thought patterns.8 6 A writing's con-
tents may provide a necessary inference as to its authenticity
where the instrument contains details known only to the
writer. If the person alleged to be the writer is shown to have
known those details, then one may infer that the document
was written by that particular person.8 7
Another traditional method of authentication sanctioned
by Rule 901(b)(4) is known at common law as the "reply letter
doctrine," which recognizes that a letter purporting to be a
response to a previous correspondence, which is in fact re-
sponsive to the prior letter's terms and was mailed within a
reasonable period of time after the prior letter's receipt, is
presumptively genuine. 8 The basis of the reply letter doc-
trine is knowledge. In the overwhelming majority of letters
sent, the addressee alone, having obtained exclusive control
of the letter, knows its terms and can meaningfully respond
to it.8s Since the reliability of this method of authentication
of ballistics. This analogy is not persuasive since ballistics cases almost
invariably involve known sources, i.e., one bullet from a body or a wall and
the other fired by the expert from a known gun. Such precision in source
determination is often missing where documents are involved." WEINSTEIN &
BERGER 901(b)(3)[02] at 901-31, n.3. However, the Federal Rules do have a
built-in safety valve in Rule 403, which provides for exclusion of otherwise
relevant evidence because of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. In view of
this, a reduction in strictness of Rule 901 is justified.
83. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 901(b)(4)[01] at 901-46.
84. Wood v. United States, 84 F.2d 749, 751 (5th Cir. 1936) (activity of
writer which only a few persons could know).
85. Maynard v. Bailey, 85 W. Va. 679, 102 S.E. 480 (1920) (certain let-
terheads).
86. Magnusen v. State, 187 Wis. 122, 203 N.W. 749 (1925).
87. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 901(b)(4)[01] at 901-46; 7 WIGMORE § 2148.
Wigmore states that only one person need know for the necessary proof to be
made. 7 WIGMORE § 2148. Weinstein concludes that Wigmore's theory is
unsound. According to 901(a) only evidence "sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what its proponent claims" is necessary. "Even
if the other persons would have known the details of the writing, it can be
shown under the circumstances, it was unlikely that they would have written
the letter." WEINSTEIN & BERGER 901(b)(4)[01] at 901-47.
88. McCORMICK § 225 at 552.
89. Id. at 553.
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depends upon receipt of the original letter by the purported
author of the reply, the proponent must prove that the first
letter was properly dated, mailed and addressed.9 0
Voice Identification and Telephone Communication
With the advent of modern communications, a speaker
frequently is heard but not seen. When the identity of a
speaker is a relevant inquiry, Rule 901(b)(5) provides that
identification of a voice can be made by any person who is
familiar both with the voice of the alleged speaker and the
voice sought to be identified. As in the situation where lay
opinion of handwriting is authorized, 91 the required degree of
familiarity with the alleged speaker's voice is minimal,92 only
an allegation of "some familiarity" being required.9 3 Whether
a witness actually has sufficient familiarity with the alleged
speaker's voice to make an identification is a question of fact
to be determined by the jury. Under Rule 901(b)(5) however,
unlike that for handwriting authentication, familiarity with
the alleged speaker's voice may be acquired for the sole pur-
pose of the litigation.9 4
As an alternative to a witness's hearing the alleged
speaker's voice directly, the Federal Rule 901(b)(5) recognizes
that a witness may acquire sufficient familiarity by hearing
the voice indirectly through "mechanical or electronic trans-
mission or recordings." To identify a voice heard by these
methods, however, the witness must first testify that "the
device was capable of accurately reproducing the sound. ' 9 5
Voice prints create problems under the Federal Rules
since voice prints are not heard9" but are seen as visual rep-
90. Consolidated Grocery Co. v. Hammond, 99 C.C.A. 195, 175 F. 641 (5th
Cir. 1910). See MCCORMICK § 225 at 553. One commentator has suggested that
the first letter would have to be authenticated but such a requirement seems
to be out of line with the Federal Rules' liberal attitude. WEINSTEIN &
BERGER 901(b)(4)[05] at 901-59.
91. See text at note 73, supra.
92. United States v. McCartney, 264 F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1959).
93. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 901(b)(5)[01] at 901-62. See United States v.
McCartney, 264 F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1959).
94. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 901(b)(5)[01] at 901-62.
95. Id. 901(b)(5)[02] at 901-70. See also Annot., Admissibility of Sound
Recording in Evidence, 58 A.L.R.2d 1024 (1958); 1939 LA. OPP. ATTY. GEN.
at 1344 (dictograph probably admissible upon laying proper foundation).
96. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(5) requires a voice to have been "heard first-
hand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or recording. .. ."
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resentations of the air vibrations projected by a speaker's
throat and speech organs.9 7 However, because the preamble
to Rule 901(b) clearly states that its illustrations are not
exclusive, and due to the overwhelming accuracy of voice
prints, Rule 901(b)(5) should not be so narrowly construed as
to exclude their use.9 8
Closely related to voice identification is the problem of
identification of parties to a telephone conversation. Federal
Rule 901(b)(6) sanctions a liberal method for proof of the iden-
tity of a party to a telephone call. The proponent need only
prove that the call was made99 under circumstances which,
taken as a whole, indicate that the party answering was the
person called. The Rule adopts the position of most jurisdic-
tions for outgoing calls: proof of the fact that the call was
made combined with the self-identification of the person
answering is sufficient'0 0 to establish identity.
A more difficult problem not expressly covered by the
Rule arises when the identity of a caller must be established.
Certainly, mere self-identification by a caller will not
suffice' 0 ' unless accompanied by circumstances clearly jus-
tifying an inference that the caller is who he claims to be. 0 2
Supporting circumstances can take the form of the recipient's
general familiarity with the speaker's voice, 0 3 the caller's
access to information known only by the speaker, 0 4 or any of
the methods for proving documents. 0 5
97. See Kersta, Speaker Recognition and Identification by Voice Prints,
40 CONN. B. J. 586 (1966).
98. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 901(b)(5)[01] at 901-69; People v. Straehel, 53
Misc. 2d 512, 279 N.Y.S.2d 115 (court permitted use of a voice print). Contra,
People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1968) (overturned convic-
tion based on voice print). But see FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4), 901(b)(5).
99. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 901(b)(6)[01] at 901-77.
100. MCCORMICK § 266. Courts recognize the practical accuracy of the
telephone system and are persuaded in the normal case that recipients of
phone calls lack both motive and opportunity for premeditated fraud.
101. Robilio v. United States, 291 F. 975, 982 (6th Cir. 1923); Price v.
State, 208 Ga. 695, 69 S.E.2d 253 (1952); State v. Berezuk, 331 Mo. 626, 55
S.W.2d 949, 951 (1932); Texas Candy & Nut Co. v. Horton, 235 S.W.2d 518, 521
(Civ. App. Tex. 1950).
102. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 901(b)(6)[02] at 901-81.
103. See Annot., 105 A.L.R. 326 (1936), 71 A.L.R. 3 (1931).
104. E.g., United States v. Ross, 321 F.2d 61 (2nd Cir. 1963).
105. A telephone call, like a letter, can be authenticated by the fact that
it is a reply to previous correspondence. See Van Riper v. United States, 13
F.2d 961, 968 (2nd Cir. 1926); Morris v. Finkelstein, 145 S.W.2d 439, 443 (Mo.
App. 1940) (telephone call in response to letter).
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When a telephone call is placed to a business, and the
answerer purports to act in behalf of the business and en-
gages in transactions customarily performed over the phone,
the Federal Rules permit the assumption that the call
reached the business. The Rule rests on the assumption that
listing a business number in a public directory is an invita-
tion to the public to carry on business over the phone; the
proprietor of a business cannot thereafter bar the admission
of the call's substance by denying the authority of one
answering the call to act in behalf of the business. 10 6
Public Records
Because of the belief that public officers regularly comply
with their statutory obligations in accepting for recordation
only those writings which are genuine,1 0 7 courts have tradi-
tionally assumed that records found in the custody of the
public officers authorized to record such documents are au-
thentic. Two requisites are generally considered necessary
for authentication of public records.1 0 First, the writing must
be a public record actually recorded; 10 9 and second, the cus-
todianship of the public officer must be proved. 110 The Rule
106. Merich v. Baum, 53 F.2d 986, 988 (8th Cir. 1931); WEINSTEIN &
BERGER 901(b)(6)[011 at 901-79: "Identification of the speaker is not neces-
sary when the issue is the identity of the place of business called and not the
individual purporting to represent the business." WEINSTEIN & BERGER
9 901(b)(6)[O1] at 901-79.
107. McCORMICK § 224 at 551.
108. Most public records will be self-authenticating under Rule 902. See
text beginning at note 20, supra.
109. Public records as used in Federal Rule 901(b)(7) is intended to in-
clude "any writing or data compilation authorized by law to be recorded or
filed in a public record." WEINSTEIN & BERGER $ 901(b)(7)[01] at 901-94. See
also United States v. Ward, 173 F.2d 628 (2nd Cir. 1949) (judicial records);
Maroon v. Immigration & Nationalization Serv., 364 F.2d 982 (8th Cir. 1966);
O'Brien v. United States, 192 F.2d 948 (8th Cir. 1951) (military records); Lewis
v. United States, 38 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1930). Similarly, where a public office is
the depository of private papers, such as wills or conveyances, these too
qualify as public records. See generally MCCORMICK § 224 at 551.
110. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 901(b)(7)[01] at 901-97. Proper custody can
be established by testimony of a person from the office authorized to retain
the documents, United States v. Locke, 425 F.2d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1970), by
certification from such an office, Woods v. Turk, 171 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1948),
by the testimony of a witness with knowledge of its recordation, Wausau
Sulphate Fibre Co. v. Commissioner, 61 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1932), by judicial
notice, Maroon v. Immigration & Nationalization Serv., 364 F.2d 982, 984 (8th
Cir. 1966), or by other proof sufficient to support a finding that the material is
from the proper office.
1975]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
seems far too broad. The basic assumption necessary for its
justification is that the custodian actually inspects a docu-
ment's authenticity before accepting it for recordation. This
is true for documents of the type found in Rule 803(8), 111 but
not of recorded documents generally.
In addition to written public records, Federal Rule
901(b)(7) recognizes that evidence from "other data compila-
tion" devices may be authenticated, including "video-tapes or
other non-print matter kept by a public officer .... ,,12 Al-
though Rule 901(b)(7) does not expressly cover private writings
in private custody, since Rule 901(b) is illustrative only no
reason exists why a court should not recognize private writ-
ings as authentic after a proper showing of custodianship and
other circumstantial evidence indicating the authenticity of
the document. 113
Ancient Documents and Data Compilation
The common law early developed a rule for authentica-
tion of ancient documents:1 1 4 a document was admissible
when "thirty years old,... unsuspicious in appearance, and ...
produced from a place of custody natural for such a docu-
ment."'1 5 In Federal Rule 901(b)(8) Congress codified the
common law requirements and those of Louisiana also1 6 with
111. FED. R. EVID. 803(8): "Records, reports, statements, or data compila-
tions, in any form, of public offices or agencies... are not excluded by the
hearsay rule."
112. See generally Sullivan, Court Record by Video-tape Experiment-A
Success, 50 CHI. B. REC. 336 (Ap. 1969).
113. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2268; Preferred Inv. Corp. v. Denson, 251 So. 2d
455 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
114. The principal impetus for its development was necessity. Problems
of loss of memory and the death of witnesses were remedied by application of
the ancient documents rule. See generally MCCORMICK § 223.
115. MCCORMICK § 223 at 549-50.
116. LA. R.S. 13:3727-31 (1950) authorize admission of ancient documents,
notwithstanding the requirements of both the hearsay rule and authentica-
tion of documents, and presume genuine written acts recorded in the con-
veyance records of any parish in the state for a period not less than 22 years,
or "any instrument of writing, including maps, plats and surveys, which
[have] been recorded in the conveyance, mortgage, donation, miscellaneous
or other official records of any parish of the state . . . for a period of thirty
years or more at the time such instrument is offered in evidence." The
Louisiana scheme is more onerous than that of either the common law or the
Federal Rule in its requirement of recordation before the ancient documents
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two modifications. The time period is reduced to twenty
years,117 and the category of materials subject to the rule is
expanded to include non-traditional documents such as
electronically-stored data.""
The age of a document offered under Rule 901(b)(8) may be
proved by "any facts supporting the inference that the docu-
ment or data compilation has been in existence for twenty
years or more."" 9 Erasures, inconsistent assertions, discon-
tinuity of handwriting, and unexplained changes in author-
ship usually create a "suspicious appearance"; 20 however,
certain documents are by their nature "unsuspicious.'' . Fi-
nally, though reasonable custody of a document must be es-
tablished, 122 the document need not remain in the same place
for the entire custodial period.123
rule applies. See United States v. Buras, 332 F. Supp. 1007 (E.D. La. 1971);
Broussard v. Guidry, 127 La. 708, 53 So. 964 (1911); Roy v. Elmer, 153 So. 2d
209 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963). The presumption of genuineness is rebuttable
with the burden of proof on the party assailing the document. Watkins v.
Zeigler, 147 So. 2d 435 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962). -
117. The Advisory Committee thought a fraud lasting twenty years
highly improbable. FED. R. EVID. 901, Adv. Comm. Note.
118. Query, does the Rule include photostatic copies, magnetic impulse,
or mechanical records? Rule 1001 ends the list of illustrations of writings by
the clause "or other forms of data compilations," which suggests that the
previously listed items are considered "data compilations." Rule 901(b)(8)
expressly covers "data compilations in any form." Because Rule 901(b)(8) is
merely illustrative, it should not be given a narrow interpretation, and
should be read to include photostatic copies, magnetic impulse, or mechanical
records. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, 901(b)(8)[01] at 901-98.
119. Federal judges hopefully will recognize the shift of emphasis to the
presumption of authenticity based on custody and admit evidence when
circumstances otherwise point to its genuineness although its age falls short
of the required period. See Lee Pong Tai v. Acheson, 104 F. Supp. 503 (E.D.
Pa. 1952).
120. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 901(b)(8)[01] at 901-102.
121. See, e.g., Dallas County v. Commercial Assur. Co., 286 F.2d 388, 397
(5th Cir. 1961) (newspaper stored in warehouse for long period).
122. To establish the appropriateness of a document's custody, the pro-
ponent of the evidence must show the document was kept where it would
have been likely to be kept if it was in fact genuine. For example, if the
questioned document is a deed to land, custody by a legatee would satisfy the
Rule. See Fulkerson v. Holmes, 117 U.S. 389 (1886). See also Smyth v. New
Orleans Canal & Banking Co., 93 F. 899 (5th Cir. 1899).
123. If the document does change hands, however, the Rule requires a
showing that all of the places of custody were appropriate. See McGuire
v. Blount, 199 U.S. 142 (1905).
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The Best Evidence Rule
Although the "best evidence rule" at its inception was a
very liberal principle requiring only "the best proof that the
nature of the thing will afford,"'1 it quickly developed into a
"converse and narrowing doctrine that a man must produce
the best evidence that is available-second best will not
do."'1 25 Though variously expressed in different jurisdictions,
the traditional view treats the best evidence rule as a nar-
rowly applicable rule requiring that "in proving the terms of
a writing, where the terms are material, the original writing
must be produced unless it is shown to be unavailable for
some reason other than the serious fault of the proponent."' 126
The obvious purpose of the best evidence rule is to insure
the reliability and trustworthiness of written evidence. 127
Continued viability of the rule is mandated by the intrinsic
importance of written evidence in the litigation process, the
possibility of intentional fraud, 28 the danger of human error
in transcription, 129 and the danger of misrepresentation,
whether innocent or fraudulent, which may result from re-
liance on parts of a document taken out of context. 130 Provid-
124. Ford v. Hopkins, 91 Eng. Rep. 250 (1700) (secondary documentary
evidence admitted over objection that only the original should be ad'mis-
sible).
125. MCCORMICK § 229 at 559.
126. MCCORMICK § 230 at 560. Even though the best evidence rule applies
only to proving the contents of a writing, "the fact that a man does not
produce the best evidence in his power must always afford strong ground of
suspicion." THAYER at 507.
127. A. OSBORN, QUFsTIONED DOCUMENTS XVI (2nd ed. 1929). See also
Note, A Critical Appraisal of the Application of the Best Evidence Rule, 21
RUT. L. REV. 526, 528 (1967).
128. The assertion that the best evidence rule prevents fraud has been
heavily criticized and has lost much of its force, though it would be erroneous
to completely discount it. Wigmore strongly attacks earlier commentators'
assertions that the best evidence rule had as its basis the prevention of
fraud. 4 WIGMORE § 1180.
129. "[T]here is substantial hazard of inaccuracy in many commonly
utilized methods of making copies of writings, and ... oral testimony purport-
ing to give from memory the terms of a writing is probably subject to a
greater risk of error than oral testimony concerning other situations gener-
ally." MCCORMICK § 231 at 561. See also Broun, Authentication and Contents
of Writings, 1969 LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 611, 616. However, most of
these theoretical bases for the best evidence rule have been undercut in
recent years, due to modern techniques of copying and discovery devices.
WEINSTEIN & BERGER 1001[02] at 1002-6.
130. At least one case has recognized that the original writing furnishesI
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ing the jury with the exact words contained in a writing is
especially important when a document may be dispositive of
the rights of the parties, as in the case of wills, trusts, or
mortgages, since a minor variation in terms can radically
change the meaning of the document. 131
The Contemporary Best Evidence Rule Under
the Federal Rules of Evidence
Although the jurisprudence is unclear whether the best
evidence rule in Louisiana is to be given its narrow meaning,
or whether it is to apply broadly to the admission of all evi-
dence, 13 2 the Federal Rules of Evidence have adopted the
preferable view that restricts the rule's application to
documentary evidence. 133 Rule 1002134 is a restatement of the
traditional best evidence rule 35 expanded to encompass not
only writings, 136 but also recordings and photographs, includ-
its full content and eliminates misrepresentation caused by taking part of
the writing out of context. Toho Bussan Kaisha, Ltd. v. American President
Lines, Ltd., 265 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1959); 4 WIGMORE § 1177 (Chadbourn rev.
1972).
131. See generally MCCORMICK § 231 at 561; MORGAN at 385.
132. LA. R.S. 15:436 (1950) establishes a broad "best evidence" require-
ment for criminal cases. Most civil cases in Louisiana recognize a simple
"original writing" requirement only, while some call for the "best evidence"
in its broad sense. See, e.g., Ascension Builders, Inc. v. Jumonville, 262 La.
519, 263 So. 2d 875 (1972); State v. McCrory, 237 La. 747, 112 So. 2d 432 (1959).
For cases limiting the best evidence rule's application to documents, see
United States v. Ponder, 475 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1973), Washington Aluminum
Co. v. Pittman Construction Co., 383 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1967), Auto-For-Rent,
Inc. v. Provenza, 242 So. 2d 353 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970), In re Fischbein, 194
So. 2d 388 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967). For cases not so limiting the best evidence
rule's application, see Southern Discount Co. v. Marchand, 218 So. 2d 645 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1969). Ward v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 182 So. 2d 130
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 248 La. 1103, 184 So. 2d 26 (1966). Even in
criminal cases, however, the broad best evidence rule provided by statute has
been tempered by a common sense approach taken by the Louisiana Supreme
Court. See, e.g., State v. Fallon, 290 So. 2d 273 (La. 1974).
133. FED. R. EVID. 1002: "To prove the content of a writing, recording, or
photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except
as otherwise provided in these Rules or by Act of Congress."
134. For text of Rule 1002, see note 133, supra.
135. The omission of the term "best evidence" from the Federal Rules
was intentional, as the Advisory Committee felt that the label "best evi-
dence" was "misleadingly broad in its scope." WEINSTEIN & BERGER
1001[01] at 1002-3.
136. Rather than giving the word "writing" an artificial definition in
order to expand the best evidence rule, as did the MODEL CODE OF EVID. rule
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ing video tapes, X-rays, and motions pictures. Clearly, the
best evidence rule as traditionally understood does not apply
to wholly uninscribed chattels, 137 but problems do arise with
items such as badges, tombstones, and flags which have in-
scriptions in varying degrees of detail and which are fre-
quently relevant to some issue in litigation.138 Although the
Federal Rules do not specifically cover these items, Rule
1008139 should be construed to permit the court in its discre-
tion to require production of the original item; factors to be
considered by the court are the need for the exact informa-
tion, the relative ease or difficulty of producing the item, and
the degree of detail involved in the inscription. 140
When a document is offered into evidence a fundamental
question is whether the writing is in fact the best evidence
available. Merely because the events are recorded in written
form, oral testimony of a witness with knowledge of the
events is not precluded. 1 4 1 Some transactions, however, are
1(17) and UNIFORM RULE OF EVID. 1(13), the Advisory Committee expressly
enlarged the coverage of items subject to the rule to include various kinds of
recordings. See generally WEINSTEIN & BERGER 1001(1)[01] at 1001-11;
Comment, Authentication and the Best Evidence Rule under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 195 (1969). Federal Rule 1001 broadly
defines "writings" as "letters, words, or numbers, or their equivalent set
down by handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photographing,
magnetic impulse, mechanical or electronic recording, or other form of data
compilation."
137. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 1001(1)[01] at 1001-11. But see 4 WIGMORE
§ 1181.
138. MCCORMICK § 232 at 562.
139. FED. R. EVID. 1008 provides: "When the admissibility of other evi-
dence of contents of writings, recordings, or photographs under these Rules
depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the question whether the
condition has been fulfilled is ordinarily for the court to determine in accor-
dance with the provisions of rule 104. However, when an issue is raised (a)
whether the asserted writing ever existed, or (b) whether another writing,
recording, or photograph produced at the trial is the original, or (c) whether
other evidence of contents correctly reflects the contents, the issue is for the
trier of fact to determine as in the case of other issues of fact."
140. 4 WIGMORE § 1182. Only a few federal cases have dealt with prob-
lems of admissibility of inscribed chattels, but cases that have considered the
issue have generally refused to apply the best evidence rule to evidence other
than documents. See, e.g., Burney v. United States, 339 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1964)
(oral testimony as to contents of bottle sufficient). But see Watson v. United
States, 224 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1955) (conviction based on oral testimony of
defendant's failure to obtain whiskey tax labels reversed because bottles not
introduced into evidence).
141. MORGAN at 386. For example, payment can be proved without pro-
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by nature reduced to writing, such as a will, trust, or
mortgage; in such cases, the original must be introduced,
since proof of the document necessarily involves the proof of
its contents. 142 Since by its terms Rule 1002 applies only when
the contents of a document are to be proved, the original need
not be produced when the witness uses a document merely to
refresh his memory,'143 as the basis of an expert opinion, 44 or
to establish that particular language is not contained in the
document. 45 Also, evidence of the existence or execution of
a document is not within the coverage of the rule and may
be accepted without production of the original document.
46
Photographs are normally used to illustrate oral tes-
timony 4 7 rather than to prove their content; 148 thus the best
evidence rule does not usually apply. However, in some situa-
tions, as in cases involving pornography, copyright infringe-
duction of a receipt, which records an "essentially non-written transaction."
MCCORMICK § 233 at 563-64.
142. See generally WEINSTEIN & BERGER 1002 [03] at 1002-9, 10. These
writings are described by McCormick as endowed by substantive law "with a
degree of either indispensability or primacy." MCCORMICK § 233. See 4 WIG-
MORE § 1242. Accord, LA. CIv. CODE art. 2276.
143. Wier v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 675, 678 (6th Cir. 1960). Cf. United
States v. Riccardi, 174 F.2d 883 (3rd Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 941
(1949).
144. This conclusion is necessary since Rules 703 and 705 allow the ex-
pert to utilize information which would be inadmissible at trial in forming his
opinion. See, e.g., Grummons v. Gallinger, 240 F. Supp. 63, 72 (N.D. Ind. 1964),
aff'd, 341 F.2d 464 (7th Cir. 1965) (best evidence rule not applicable to an
expert questioned about another expert's report).
145. Though many courts accept this conclusion, it has not been without
its detractors. McCormick considers that under some circumstances, the ab-
sence of language in a document will have positive evidentiary value, and
that in such cases the best evidence rule should be applied. MCCORMICK,
supra note 19, § 198 at 411. See United States v. Jewett, 438 F.2d 495, 498 (8th
Cir. 1971). Compare Burney v. United States, 339 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1964).
146. See, e.g., Fish v. Fleishman, 87 Idaho 126, 391 P.2d 344 (1964) (check
stub utilized to show existence of check); Succession of Gussman, 288 So. 2d
665 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1974); Redwine v. King, 366 P.2d 921 (Okla. 1961)
(document not required to prove execution of lease). But see 4 WIGMORE
§ 1242.
147. See generally MCCORMICK § 232 at 563.
148. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 1001(2104] at 1001-43 (use of X-ray entails
proof of its content, thus the original print must be produced). But see FED.
R. EVID. 703. The minority rule is that "the expert testimony itself is the best
evidence and therefore the X-rays do not have to be produced." WEINSTEIN &
BERGER 1001(2104] at 1001-46. See FED. R. EVID. 1002, Adv. Comm. Note.
See also Arnold v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 89 S.W.2d 81 (Mo. 1936) (apply-
ing the minority rule).
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ment, or defamation, the contents of a photograph will be at
issue. In these situations, Rule 1000(2) provides that the
"original" must be produced.149
Originals, Duplicates, and Copies
An "original" as defined in Rule 1001 is a document which
according to substantive law'50 or the intent of the parties,
has legal effect between the parties to the document. Under
the Federal Rules, chronology is not decisive, since the docu-
ment's "jural significance makes it the original.' 1 5 1
Common law accorded carbon copies, distinguished from
other copies, the status of duplicates and made them admissi-
ble without accounting for the original.1 52 In recent years
more reliable photographic reproduction has generally re-
placed the carbon copy, but the former remains at common
law secondary evidence. 5 3 The definition of "duplicate" in
Rule 1001(4) differs from the common law and expands the
term to include any method of reproduction which assures
accuracy. 154
149. See generally WEINSTEIN & BERGER, 1001(2101] at 1001-16. It will
generally be to the proponent's advantage to produce the photograph, so this
problem will seldom arise.
150. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 1001(3101] at 1001-50; MCCORMICK § 235 at
566. Often "copy" is used to describe what is, under the Federal Rules, an
original, and therefore terminology, is not decisive. WEINSTEIN & BERGER
1001(3)101] at 1001-49. See McDonald v. Hanks, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 140, 113
S.W. 604 (1908). See LA. R.S. 13:3733 (Supp. 1952) (record of a business,
industry, profession, occupation and calling of every kind produced by a
photographic process assuring reliability treated as an original). See also
State v. Jackson, 296 So. 2d 320 (La. 1974) (admission of duplicate copy not
reversible error).
151. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 1001(3[01] at 1001-49. Documents which at
common law would be called duplicate originals will be treated as originals
under Rule 1001(3). See, e.g., Wright v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 130 F. 843 (6th
Cir. 1904).
152. See MCCORMICK 236 at 568. The reason for the distinction was that
carbon copies were created by the same stroke of the pen. See, e.g., Interna-
tional Harvester Co. v. Elfstrom, 101 Minn. 263, 112 N.W. 252 (1907).
153. MCCORMICK § 236 at 569. See, e.g., Cox v. State, 93 Ga. App. 533, 92
S.E.2d 260 (1956) (photostats are secondary evidence).
154. The definition limits the effect of the common law rule that copies
created subsequent to the original are merely secondary evidence to those
situations where they are produced manually. The purpose for which a copy
is made is totally disregarded as a factor in determining its status under the
definition, so that a photostat created for the trial is a duplicate. WEINSTEIN
& BERGER 1001(4101] at 1001-68. The Rule reduces expense and provides a
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Rule 1003155 provides that duplicates should generally be
treated as originals and admitted into evidence without the
necessity of accounting for the original. 156 The general rule,
however, is qualified in two ways. First,' fairness requires
that the original be produced when. to allow anything less
would result in substantial prejudice to the other party. 157
For example, when the reproduction process results in a
faulty copy, 158 or when only a part of the original is copied so
that the duplicate lacks proper context, 5 9 fairness demands
production of the original. Second, when genuine questions
arise regarding the authenticity of the original, its produc-
tion may be necessary to resolve the conflict.
Proof of a Writing's Contents by Secondary Evidence
The best evidence rule is one of preference rather than
exclusion, and "if failure to produce the original is satisfac-
torily explained, secondary evidence is admissible."'"0 Rule
1004161 articulates a modified restatement of the common law
reliable document for use at trial. Id. at 1001-75. See also HEARINGS BEFORE
THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 93rd Congress, 1st Sess. on Pro-
posed Rules of Evidence, Supp. Serv. no. 2 at 83-84 (1973). Accord, State v.
Jackson, 296 So. 2d 320 (La. 1974); LA. R.S. 13:3733 (Supp. 1952).
155. FED. R. EVID. 1003 provides: "A duplicate is admissible to the same
extent as an original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the authen-
ticity of the original or (2) in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit
the duplicate in lieu of the original."
156. Rule 1003 is subject to the provisions of Rule 1009 which affords the
trial judge broad discretion in determining whether an opposing party has
raised a legitimate objection to an offered duplicate. WEINSTEIN & BERGER
1003[01) at 1003-06.
157. Id.
158. United States v. Alexander, 326 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1964).
159. Marker v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 273 F.2d 158 (5th Cir.
1959); Comment, Authentication and the Best Evidence Rule Under the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 227 (1969). See also Hi-Hat Elkhorn
Coal Co. v. Kelly, 205 F. Supp. 764 (E.D. Ky. 1962) (duplicate excluded because
available only to one party while original available to both); Sance v. Bur-
nett, 316 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1958) (duplicate of libelous letter excluded because
publication of original not proved). Fairness also demands exclusion of a
duplicate when it is substantially unreliable. See Evans v. Holsinger, 242
Iowa 990, 48 N.W.2d 250 (1951).
160. FED. R. EVID. 1004, Adv. Comm. Note; 4 WIGMORE § 1192 (Chadbourn
Rev. 1972).
161. FED. R. EVID. 1004: "The original is not required, and other evidence
of the contents of a writing, recording, or photograph is admissible if ... [a]ll
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rules and is in substantial accord with Louisiana jurispru-
dence. 162 The Rule provides that when the original is proved
unavailable, secondary evidence may be used to satisfy the
best evidence rule. Unavailability of the original may be ac-
tual, through loss, destruction, or insusceptibility to judicial
process, or constructive as when it is in the possession of an
adverse party who refuses to produce it after notice. Rule
1004 strikes a delicate balance between the danger of fraud
and the need for relevant information 163 by allowing secon-
dary evidence, in those instances in which the best evidence
rule applies, only after the proponent proves he has made a
diligent, good faith 6 4 attempt to secure production of the lost,
destroyed or unobtainable document.16 5
originals are lost or have been destroyed, unless the proponent lost or de-
stroyed them in bad faith; or (2) . . .[n]o original can be obtained by any
available judicial process or procedure; or (3) ... [a]t a time when an original
was under the control of the party against whom offered, he was put on
notice, by the pleadings or otherwise, that the contents would be a subject of
proof at the hearing, and he does not produce the original at the hearing; or
(4) . . . [t]he writing, recording, or photograph is not closely related to a
controlling issue."
162. The production of the original is excused in Louisiana because of
loss or destruction. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2270 (not affected by LA. CIV. CODE
art. 2280, White v. White, 156 La. 324, 100 So. 442 (1924)); LA. CIV. CODE art.
2279, 2280; Airey v. Sampson, 262 La. 383, 263 So. 2d 330 (1972); Fidelity Nat'l
Bank v. Jack Neilson, Inc., 248 So. 2d 412 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971); Tri-State
Ins. Co. v. Elmore Labiche Plumbing Co., 212 So. 2d 255 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1968). Even if the proponent of the secondary evidence destroyed the origi-
nal, the secondary evidence is still admissible provided he shows lack of
fraudulent intent. Harrison v. Occhipinti, 251 So. 2d 188 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1971). Other excuses for not producing the original include possession by the
adversary, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1881), Breaux v. Laird, 230 La.
221, 88 So. 2d 33 (1956), State v. McBrayer, 188 La. 567, 177 So. 669 (1937),
when the original is on file in the public records, Beauvais v. Wall, 14 La.
Ann. 199 (1859), and when the original is beyond the jurisdiction of the court,
State v. Brooks, 173 La. 9, 136 So. 71 (1931).
163. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, 1004(2)[01] at 1004-23, 24: "The phrase 'to
the extent practicable and reasonable' should be read into the Rule." Id. at
1004-24. The condition of Rule 1004(2) should generally be satisfied by proof of
service of a notice to take depositions and the attached subpoena duces
tecum required by FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1).
164. See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 89 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1937). See
also 4 WIGMORE § 1178.
165. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 1004(1)[04] at 1004-13; Annot., Degree or
Quantum of Evidence Necessary to Establish a Lost Instrument and Its Con-
tents, 148 A.L.R. 400 (1944). The degree of diligence varies with the cir-
cumstances of the case. Hacker v. Price, 166 Pa. Supp. 404, 71 A.2d 851 (1950).
In the majority of cases the fact of loss or destruction will be proved by
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Witnesses often refer to documents in their testimony,
and as a "necessary concession to expedition of trials and
clearness of narration,"'16 6 an exception has developed provid-
ing that the documents need not be produced when they are
merely incidental or collateral to the issue tried. The Federal
Rules recognize this exception to Rule 1004(4), and in doing
so, give needed flexibility to the best evidence rule167 and
provide another method for the exercise of common sense.16 8
When an original is justifiably unavailable, both Lou-
isiana and the common law have established rules of pref-
erence favoring written copies over oral evidence, and recent
copies over remote ones.169 Federal Rule 1004 represents a
substantial departure from the rule of preferences by provid-
ing that where the original is justifiably unavailable, a party
seeking to prove the contents of a writing may utilize any
evidence otherwise admissible. 17 0 Rule 1005 retains the com-
mon law distinction between public documents and non-public
documents, providing that when the former are to be proved,
the additional requirement that the proponent make a dili-
gent effort to obtain an appropriate copy must be met before
any other admissible evidence may be used to prove their con-
tents.17 ' The procedure sanctioned by the Federal Rules ap-
circumstantial evidence "showing a diligent but unsuccessful search and
inquiry ... for the document." WEINSTEIN & BERGER 1004(1)[05] at 1004-19.
166. MCCORMICK § 234 at 565. See, e.g., Joseph Durst Corp. v. Coastal
Development Co., 177 So. 2d 123 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1965).
167. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 1004(4)[01] at 1004-30.
168. Id. at 1004-32. "Whether a document is collateral is practically a
question of whether it is important enough under all the curcumstances to
need production; and the judge presiding over the trial is fittest to determine
this question finally." 4 WIGMORE § 1253. See also FED. R. EVID. 1008.
169. Succession of Hilton, 165 So. 2d 332 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964); Warwick
v. Louisiana Hwy Comm'n, 4 So. 2d 607 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1944). MCCORMICK
§ 241 at 576 states: "This view is justifiable chiefly on the ground that there is
some incongruity in pursuing the policy of obtaining the terms of writings
with fullest accuracy, by structuring a highly technical rule to that end, only
to abandon it upon the unavailability of the original."
170. WEINSTEIN & BERGER 1004[01] at 1004-4.
171. FED. R. EVID. 1005 provides: "The contents of an official record, or of
a document authorized to be recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed,
including data compilations in any form, if otherwise admissible, may be
proved by a copy certified as correct in accordance with Rule 902 or testified
to be correct by a witness who has compared it with the original. If a copy
which complies with the foregoing cannot be obtained by exercise of a
reasonable diligence, then other evidence of the contents may be given." The
Rule relaxes the common law rule of "impossibility."
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pears less expensive and easier to administer than the rule
presently applicable in Louisiana, while at the same time
accomplishing in practical effect most, if not all, of what is
accomplished by an extended scheme of preferences. 172
Conclusion
Commentators assert that the rules requiring authenti-
cation and identification, together with the best evidence
rule, constitute necessary safeguards for the prevention of
forgery or fraud, mistaken attribution, and mistransmis-
sion.173 The Advisory Committee felt that the traditional
rules express sound policy and are necessary because of the
difficulty of discovering evidence outside the jurisdiction, and
because unanticipated documents may be undiscoverable as a
practical matter. 7 4
Several commentators, however, have severely criticized
the traditional rules as unnecessarily burdensome and of
slight benefit when weighed against the loss of time and
expense entailed in complying with them. 175 Although the
Federal Rules retain the best evidence rule and the require-
ment of authentication and identification with the safeguards
that the traditional rules were designed to provide, a number
of well-considered provisions are available to prevent them
from becoming over-burdensome. 76 Furthermore, the federal
court's application of the doctrines of harmless error,
waiver, and procedural devices such as requests for admis-
sions and pre-trial conferences should do much to mitigate
any harsh application of the Rules. 1 7?
172. An advocate will normally want to come forward with the most
convincing evidence available. See FED. R. EVID. 1004, Adv. Comm. Note.
173. See generally MCCORMICK § 231 at 561; 7 WIGMORE § 2130 at 570.
174. FED. R. EVID. 1001, Adv. Comm. Note.
175. MCCORMICK § 220 at 545; 7 WIGMORE § 2148. Broun, Authentication
and Content of Writings, 1969 LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 611; Strong,
Liberalizing the Authentication of Private Writings, 52 CORNELL L. Q. 284
(1967). See Mancari v. Smith, 72 U.S. App. D.C. 398, 114 F.2d 834 (1940);
Keegan v. Green Giant Co., 150 Me. 283, 11 A.2d 599 (1954).
176. See discussion of Rule 1001 in text at note 150, supra; Rule 1002 in
text at note 134, supra; Rule 1004 in text at note 161, supra; and Rule 1005 in
text at note 170, supra.
177. See, e.g., Atkins v. United States, 240 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1957) (apply-
ing waiver); Ahlstedt v. United States, 315 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1963) (applying
harmless error). See also, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16, 36, 61; LA. CODE CIV. P. art.
1551.
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The Federal Rules in Articles IX and X incorporate the
best rules of the common law and modify them where neces-
sary to accomplish their goal of insuring that the trier of fact
has available as much accurate and reliable evidence as pos-
sible without infringing upon the particular rights and
privileges of the parties. However, the primary value of the
Federal Rules in this area is not in the few changes that they
provide; rather, it is in their concise yet thorough expression
of the law.178 Because many of the present Louisiana rules
regarding authentication, identification, and the best evi-
dence rule correspond to those provided in the Federal Rules,
the latter, along with their voluminous legislative history,
should be studied very carefully as possible models for cod-
ification of Louisiana evidence law.
Nicholas F. LaRocca, Jr.
178. Comment, Authentication and the Best Evidence Rule Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 195 (1969).
